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ARIZONA CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION
ORGANIZATION V. WINN: RELIGION STOLE
THE MONEY FROM THE TAXPAYER JAR—
NO STANDING, THEN WHO?
Elleny Christopoulos*
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment protects against
government-established religion. This protection is meaningless,
however, if those protected are unable to challenge Establishment
Clause violations because they lack standing. In Flast v. Cohen in 1968,
the U.S. Supreme Court created an exception that allowed for taxpayer
standing in certain cases. But in Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn, the Court narrowed the doctrine by finding that
some taxpayers did not have standing to challenge a law that granted
tax credits to people who contributed to scholarship organizations,
which included religious schools. The Court reasoned that the tax
credits in Arizona Christian were different from the government
expenditures in Flast; therefore, the Court held that the Flast exception
did not apply. This Comment examines the Court’s ruling in Arizona
Christian and argues that it should have allowed standing to maintain
the integrity of the First Amendment and the freedom from governmentestablished religion.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., May 2007,
University of Wisconsin. This Comment would not have been possible without the guidance of
Professor Marcy Strauss, Joshua Rich, Calista Wu, and all of the other dedicated members of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. I would like to thank my family, and especially my loving
fiancé, Jason Malcore, for always supporting me in all that I do.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A well-known riddle poses the question: if a tree falls in the
woods with no one around to hear, does it make a noise? Likewise, if
the government spends money on religion and no one has standing to
bring a lawsuit, is there a constitutional violation? In the federal
judicial system, a lack of standing makes the case nonjusticiable, and
the case cannot be heard on its merits.1 If strict standing limitations
restrict a citizen’s ability to challenge constitutional violations, then
who will be able to challenge those violations? This Comment
focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn,2 which narrowed the definition
of standing, thereby restricting a citizen’s access to federal courts in
the Establishment Clause context.3
Arizona Christian was a challenge to an Arizona law that
granted tax credits to those who contributed money to organizations
that provided scholarships to students attending private schools,
including religious schools.4 The Court addressed only the issue of
standing in the case, deciding whether Arizona taxpayers had
standing to challenge an alleged violation of the Establishment
Clause.5 The Court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing in
the case for two reasons: (1) the plaintiffs did not meet the general
requirements for standing;6 and (2) the plaintiffs did not meet the
exception to the general rule against standing because government
expenditures are different from tax credits.7
In deciding Arizona Christian, the Court made a clear distinction
between government expenditures and tax credits, holding that
plaintiffs who challenge government expenditures for religious
purposes have standing, whereas plaintiffs who challenge tax credits
for religious purposes do not.8 This Comment argues that this
distinction is inappropriate because tax credits for religious purposes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
See id.
Id. at 1440.
Id.
Id. at 1444–45.
Id. at 1447.
Id.
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cause the same harm to the taxpayer that government expenditures
do. Accordingly, the Court should have found standing in this case.
Part II of this Comment gives a brief history of the standing
doctrine and the Establishment Clause. Part III discusses Arizona
Christian and its factual background. Part IV explains the reasoning
of the Court. Part V discusses the potential negative effect of Arizona
Christian on future Establishment Clause cases, asserting that if
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge Establishment Clause
violations such as this, no one will have the ability to challenge such
violations. Finally, Part VI concludes by arguing that the Court
should have decided Arizona Christian differently in order to
maintain the integrity of the First Amendment and the freedom from
government-established religion.
II. HISTORICAL
FRAMEWORK
In order to fully understand the nature of the Court’s decision in
Arizona Christian, it is necessary to first understand the background
principles of the standing doctrine. Accordingly, this section
discusses: (1) standing in general; (2) taxpayer standing; and (3)
exceptions to the general standing requirement.
A. Standing in General
Article III of the Constitution mandates that federal courts rule
only on cases or controversies.9 Although Article III does not use the
term “standing” in its language,10 the Court has historically
interpreted this mandate to mean that plaintiffs must first establish
standing in order to bring a case in federal court.11 The Court’s
interpretation came from the English legal tradition requiring “the
need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute.”12 As part
of the system of checks and balances between the branches of the
government, the standing requirement acts as a restriction on the
federal judiciary.13 The judiciary does not have the power to question
the constitutionality of acts of the legislative or executive branches
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 1442; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984).
U.S. CONST. art. III.
See Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1442.
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1442.
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unless there is an actual case or controversy brought before it.14 This
limit is said to “maintain the public’s confidence in an unelected . . .
judiciary” and give legitimacy to judicial decrees.15
According to the Court’s interpretation of Article III, standing
has three basic requirements: (1) the plaintiff must suffer an actual
particularized injury; (2) “there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) it must be likely
that the injury can be redressed by a court decision.16 The party who
brings the claim bears the burden of establishing these elements.17
The injury must be actual or imminent and not hypothetical.18 The
causal connection between the injury and the conduct cannot be “too
attenuated.”19 As to redressability, “a plaintiff satisfies the . . .
requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a
discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision
will relieve his every injury.”20 All three of these requirements must
be satisfied for a plaintiff to establish standing under Article III.21
Too much speculation regarding any of these requirements suggests
that a plaintiff will not have standing to bring a case.22
B. Taxpayer Standing
Taxpayer standing is analyzed as a separate, extremely limited
category. The general concept that standing cannot be based only on
a plaintiff’s taxpayer status dates back to 1923’s Frothingham v.
Mellon23 case.24 There, a taxpayer alleged that certain federal
expenditures exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.25 The

14. See id.; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).
15. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1442.
16. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
17. Id. at 561; FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
19. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
20. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982).
21. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
22. Id.
23. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
24. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1443 (2011); Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600 (2007); Frothingham, 262 U.S. at
487.
25. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479–80. The plaintiff in Frothingham brought an action
challenging the “Maternity Act,” which appropriated federal funds to the states to help reduce
maternal and infant mortality. Id. at 479. The plaintiff alleged that the act was a usurpation of
power that the Constitution had not granted Congress and was therefore unconstitutional. Id.
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taxpayer claimed injury based on her potential increase in tax
liability due to Congress’s unconstitutional spending.26
The Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument because the alleged
injury was too “remote, fluctuating and uncertain” to constitute a
case or controversy under Article III.27 Because millions of other
taxpayers shared the taxpayer’s interest in how the government spent
her money, the Court found that the issue was not for the judiciary to
decide but rather a matter of public concern to be resolved through
the political system.28 Thus, the Court held that the taxpayer did not
have standing.29 Since Frothingham, it has been nearly impossible
for a plaintiff to have standing based on taxpayer status alone
without meeting an exception to the taxpayer-standing rule.30
C. Exception to the Rule—
Establishment Clause Standing
The Court created an important exception to the taxpayerstanding rule in Flast v. Cohen31 in 1968.32 There, it allowed
taxpayer standing where taxpayers challenged an alleged violation of
the Establishment Clause.33 Specifically, the taxpayers challenged a
federal statute that allowed government expenditures to financially
support, among other things, the purchase of textbooks and other
instructional material in religious schools.34 The Court held that the
taxpayers had standing, and it created a two-part test to determine
when standing exists simply based on the plaintiff’s status as a
taxpayer.35
The first part of the test requires that a plaintiff show a “logical
link” between his or her taxpayer status and the “type of legislative
enactment attacked.”36 In Flast, this link existed because the
taxpayers alleged that the government collected and spent tax dollars

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 477.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 487–89.
Id. at 488.
See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1443 (2011).
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 85–88.
Id.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 102.
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on religious schools.37 The second part of the test requires that there
be a “nexus” between the taxpayer status and the “precise nature of
the constitutional infringement alleged.”38 In Flast, the taxpayers met
this condition because the complaint alleged that the government had
violated the Establishment Clause, unlike in other cases where
taxpayers did not allege a constitutional violation.39
The Flast Court found support for this exception to taxpayer
standing by looking at the nation’s history, particularly the writings
of James Madison.40 The Madisonian view was that a taxpayer
should not have to contribute any amount of his property—not even
“three pence”—to religious purposes.41 Turning to Flast, the injury
was not monetary from any increase in taxes as a result of the law
but rather that the “conscience would be violated if citizens were
required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose
beliefs they disagreed.”42 Flast was significant because it was the
first successful taxpayer standing case.43 However, since Flast, the
Court has been unwilling to find this exception to the general
taxpayer-standing rule outside the context of Establishment Clause
claims.44

37. Id. at 103; cf. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (finding no standing in an
Establishment Clause case where the plaintiff sued when federal funds were used for recitation of
Bible cases in public school because it involved at most an incidental expenditure of tax funds).
38. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
39. Id. at 103. Compare the constitutional challenge in Flast, where a specific constitutional
clause was challenged, to the nonspecific challenge in Frothingham. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
40. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1446 (2011); Flast, 392 U.S.
at 103.
41. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1901)).
42. Noah Feldman, Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346,
351 (2002).
43. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85, 106.
44. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1445; Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551
U.S. 587, 609 (2007) (“[This Court has] declined to lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits
alleging violations of any constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause.”).
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III. STATEMENT OF
THE CASE
A. Factual Background
Arizona Christian was a challenge to an Arizona law that
provides tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations
(STOs).45 These STOs use the contributed funds to give scholarships
to students attending private schools.46 Many of the private schools
that receive scholarship money are religious schools.47 Respondents
in this case, a group of Arizona taxpayers (“the taxpayers”),
challenged the tax credits, alleging that government support of these
religious schools through tax credits is a violation of the
Establishment Clause under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.48
Specifically, the taxpayers challenged section 43-1089 of the
Arizona Tax Code.49 The statute allows for tax exemptions by
granting Arizona taxpayers dollar-for-dollar tax credits for
contributions to designated STOs.50 Taxpayers are allowed a
maximum credit of $500 per person and $1,000 per married couple.51
Further, taxpayers may carry forward the credit for five years if the
credit exceeds the individual’s tax liability.52 Section 43-1089 sets
out various conditions that an entity must meet in order to qualify as
an STO, including: (1) “[t]he organization was required to be exempt
from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986”; (2) “[i]t could not limit its scholarships to students only
attending one school”; and (3) it had to distribute “‘at least ninety
percent of its annual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition
grants’ to children attending qualified schools.”53 A “qualified
school” is “defined in part as a private school in Arizona that [does]
not discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1440.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2010); Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1440.
Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1440 (citing § 43-1089(A)).
Id. (citing § 43-1089(A)).
Id. (citing § 43-1089(D)).
Id. (citing § 43-1089(G)(3)).
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or national origin.”54 This definition does not include discrimination
on the basis of religion or gender.55
The taxpayers “alleged that § 43-1089 allows STOs ‘to use State
income-tax revenues to pay tuition for students at religious schools’
[that] ‘discriminate on the basis of religion in selecting students.’”56
Specifically, the taxpayers alleged that Arizona’s STO tax credits
had an estimated annual value of more than $50 million.57 The
taxpayers claimed that they had standing to challenge Arizona’s law
based on their status as Arizona taxpayers.58
B. Procedural History
Originally, the taxpayers brought their case in state court and
challenged the law by invoking both the U.S. Constitution and the
Arizona Constitution.59 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court
rejected the claim on its merits without addressing the taxpayers’
standing.60 After the Arizona Supreme Court ruled, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari of that case.61
Next, the taxpayers filed their action in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Arizona.62 Challenging the law as a violation of the
First Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the taxpayers requested an injunction
preventing the state from allowing religious STOs to claim the tax
credit.63 The district court held that the Tax Injunction Act
jurisdictionally barred the case.64 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision
in Hibbs v. Winn.65
On remand to the district court, the Arizona Christian School
Organization and other interested parties intervened.66 Again, the
54. § 43-1089(G)(2); Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
55. See Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
56. Id. (quoting Complaint at 125a–26a, Winn v. Killian, No. CIV 00-0287 (D. Ariz. Feb.
15, 2000)).
57. Id. at 1444.
58. Id. at 1440.
59. Id. at 1441.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. An injunction was only one of several remedies that the taxpayers requested. Id.
64. Id. The Tax Injunction Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
65. 542 U.S. 88 (2004).
66. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1441.
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district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.67 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the decision, finding that the taxpayers had
standing under the Flast exception.68 The Ninth Circuit denied en
banc review,69 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.70
IV. REASONING OF
THE COURT
The Court held in a 5–4 decision that the taxpayers lacked
standing to bring the case.71 The Court reasoned that the claimed
harm is only speculative because taxpayers are not required to
contribute any of their property to the establishment of religion.72
Because the taxpayers lacked standing to bring their action, the Court
dismissed the case, which could not be heard on its merits.73
A. Majority Opinion
In arriving at this decision, the Court relied on Article III of the
Constitution, which gives the federal judiciary the power to resolve
“cases” and “controversies.”74 First, the Court rejected the idea that
the taxpayers had standing generally as taxpayers.75 The Court
maintained its general position that an individual who has paid taxes
does not have a “continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring
that those funds are not used by the Government in a way that
violates the Constitution.”76 The Court reasoned that claims of
taxpayer standing “rest on unjustifiable economic and political
speculation.”77
Here, the Court found similar problems with the taxpayers’
claim because the injury to the taxpayer was too speculative.78 In
essence, proof of injury to a taxpayer requires two inferential steps:
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 586 F.3d 649, 658 (9th Cir. 2009).
70. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1436.
71. Id. at 1449.
72. Id. at 1447.
73. See id. at 1449.
74. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity . . . .”); Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1449.
75. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1444–45.
76. Id. at 1442–43 (quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599
(2007)).
77. Id. at 1443.
78. See id. at 1444.
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(1) injury to the state from an increased burden; and (2) injury to the
taxpayer based on taxes that were raised to make up a deficit.79 Even
if the Court had accepted the taxpayers’ claim that Arizona’s STO
credits were valued at $50 million a year (it neither accepted nor
rejected this claim),80 the Court still would not have found the injury
that is required for taxpayer standing.81 The injury might be
speculative or nonexistent because the education of children is one of
the state’s principle missions and responsibilities.82 By helping
students obtain scholarships to private schools, the STO program
may have lessened the burden on Arizona’s public schools.83 If the
average cost of an STO scholarship is less than the average cost of
educating an Arizona public school student is, then the STO tax
credit may in fact not cause any financial loss to the state.84
Regardless, even if the STO credits did have negative effects on
Arizona’s budget, the Court concluded that further speculation would
be required to find injury-in-fact to the taxpayer.85 To show injury,
the taxpayers would have had to demonstrate that Arizona
lawmakers would actually raise the taxpayers’ taxes in response to
any deficit that the STO program caused.86 No facts supported such a
finding here.87 Furthermore, the Court determined that finding
causation in this situation was too speculative, stating that “the
inferential steps to show causation and redressability depends on
premises as to which there remains considerable doubt.”88 In sum,
because of the speculation that is involved in finding actual injury,
causation, and redressability, the Court did not find general taxpayer
standing here.89
Second, the Court analyzed standing under the Flast exception,
which was the taxpayers’ main argument.90 Although the taxpayers

79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Court acknowledged the Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization’s
assertion that studies indicated that the STO program may actually save the state money. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1443–45.
90. Id. at 1445.
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claimed—and the Ninth Circuit agreed91—that their case fell under
the exception to the general standing rule in Flast, the Court
disagreed.92 Instead, the Court narrowed the Flast decision by
creating a clear distinction between government tax credits and
government expenditures93: challengers of government expenditures
have standing and challengers of tax credits do not.94 Thus, the Flast
Court dealt with a government expenditure of tax funds for religion
and allowed taxpayer standing, while the Court in this case did not
allow standing because a tax credit is not the same as a government
expenditure.95
The Court recognized that tax credits and expenditures can have
“similar economic consequences,” yet it still distinguished them.96
Government expenditures with taxpayer money cause a dissenter to
“know[] that he has in some small measure been made to contribute
to an establishment in violation of conscience.”97 In this situation, the
Court recognized that there would be an injury to the taxpayer, even
if no additional tax liability were imposed on the individual.98 In
contrast, when the government does not impose a tax, there is “no
connection between [the] dissenting taxpayer and [the] alleged
establishment.”99 Tax credits here are distinguished from government
expenditures because Arizona taxpayers themselves choose whether

91. Id. at 1441.
92. Id. at 1447.
93. Tax credits are one form of tax expenditures. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970). Tax expenditures are “monetary subsidies the
government bestows on particular individuals or organizations by granting them preferential tax
treatment.” Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1452 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[D]efining ‘tax
expenditure’ for the purposes of the federal government’s budgetary process as ‘those revenue
losses attributable to provisions of the . . . tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a
deferral of tax liability.’” (citing 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006))). Tax expenditures are found within
the Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, they receive less congressional and popular scrutiny
than direct appropriations do. Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99
HARV. L. REV. 491, 493 (1985). In contrast, government expenditures are a form of direct
government financial assistance, which includes direct grants, loans, interest subsidies, guarantees
of loan repayment or interest payments, and insurance on investments. Surrey, supra, at 713.
94. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1447.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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or not to contribute to STOs,100 unlike cases where the government
collects money from taxpayers for religious purposes.101 The Court
found that because taxpayers can choose whether or not to contribute
to STOs, tax credits are sufficiently distinguishable from expenditure
cases.102 The Court held that the tax credit here was not “tantamount
to a religious tax or to a tithe and does not visit the injury identified
in Flast.”103 Thus, the taxpayers neither met the general taxpayerstanding rule nor the Flast exception, and the Court dismissed the
case for lack of standing.104
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kagan authored the dissent in Arizona Christian.105 First,
the dissent agreed with the majority that there was no standing under
the general taxpayer-standing rule.106 However, the dissent disagreed
with the majority by finding that the case did fit within the Flast
standing exception.107 Primarily, the dissent was not persuaded by
the majority’s finding that there is a distinction between a tax credit
and an expenditure, stating that the distinction “has as little basis in
principle as it has in our precedent.”108
The dissent explained how the taxpayers clearly had standing
under the Flast decision.109 First, the taxpayers challenged a
provision under the Arizona Tax Code that the legislature enacted
under its taxing and spending powers—satisfying part one of the
Flast test,110 which requires a “logical link” between taxpayer status
and the “type of legislative enactment attacked.”111 Second, the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1449. Justice Scalia wrote a short concurrence in which Justice Thomas joined. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring). The concurrence agreed that there was no standing in this case, and went
further to reject the Flast standing exception. Id. at 1449–50 (“Flast is an anomaly in our
jurisprudence, irreconcilable with the Article III restrictions on federal judicial power that our
opinions have established. I would repudiate that misguided decision and enforce the
Constitution.”).
105. Id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Kagan were Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor. Id.
106. Id. at 1451.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1450.
109. Id. at 1451–52.
110. Id.
111. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
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taxpayers alleged that the Arizona tax provision violated the
Establishment Clause—satisfying part two of the test,112 which
requires a “nexus” between taxpayer status and the “precise nature of
the constitutional infringement alleged.”113 In order to show that this
case challenged a law under the tax power, the dissent pointed to the
Court’s ruling on another issue in Hibbs, where it stated that the
claim challenged “an integral part of the State’s tax statute.”114
Next, the dissent explained why the majority’s reasoning was
flawed in distinguishing tax credits and government expenditures.115
It noted that Flast was decided more than forty years ago, and since
then not one court, including the U.S. Supreme Court, has
distinguished between the two for the purposes of standing.116 In
other cases, the Court has recognized that “[t]ax breaks ‘can be
viewed as a form of government spending.’”117
In addition to this strong precedent, the dissent provided logical
reasons for not distinguishing between tax credits and
expenditures.118 Although they differ, tax credits and expenditures
are both ways in which the government can monetarily support an
organization.119 As the dissent pointed out, “the distinction is one in
112. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
113. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
114. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1452 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542
U.S. 88, 119 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
115. Id. The dissent also points out that even on the majority’s own terms, standing should
result in this case. Id. at 1458 n.9. Arizona’s tax credit program “in fact necessitates the direct
expenditure of funds from the state treasury.” Id. at 1458–59 n.9. Presumably, activities to
support the STO program cost money, which comes from the state treasury. Id. at 1459 n.9. Thus,
the government has “extract[ed] and spen[t]” the taxpayers’ money to implement the tax credit
program. Id.
116. Id. at 1455. The Court specifically noted five Supreme Court cases involving similar
facts and where standing was found: Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664
(1970); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); and Hibbs v.
Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004). Id. at 1453. Although standing was not the issue in these cases, every
federal court has an independent obligation to consider standing even if the parties do not
question it. Id. at 1454. The dissent noted that these cases are significant because they suggest
that the taxpayers should have standing here as well, based on this precedent. Id.
117. Id. at 1456 (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 589–90 n.22 (1997)); see also Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our opinions have long recognized . . . the reality that [tax
expenditures] are ‘a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system’ . . . .”).
118. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1455.
119. Additional sources suggest that there is little to no difference between tax credits and
government expenditures. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES
3 (1985) (explaining that tax expenditures “represent government spending for favored activities
or groups, effected through the tax system rather than through direct grants, loans, or other forms
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search of a difference.”120 If the government cannot support religious
causes through direct spending, the obvious alternative would be to
offer tax credits that cannot be challenged due to lack of standing.121
The dissent used several hypothetical examples to make this
point, such as a tax credit of $500 that rewards members of the
Jewish faith for their religious devotion in lieu of receiving an annual
stipend, or a tax credit that subsidizes the ownership of crucifixes.122
Here, for example, the government would be directly giving a
member of the Jewish faith money for their religious devotion, which
would allow a taxpayer to challenge an alleged Establishment Clause
violation.123 In contrast, using the majority’s logic,124 no standing
would be allowed if the government was to give a tax credit, rather
than make a direct expenditure, for the same purpose. The dissent
used these examples to help show why the majority’s reasoning was
not sound in distinguishing between government expenditures and
tax credits for Establishment Clause standing.125
V. ANALYSIS: THE FUTURE
OF ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE STANDING
Arizona Christian sets a dangerous precedent for the future of
Establishment Clause cases. In the words of Justice Kagan, it
“devastates taxpayer standing.”126 By calling the injury to taxpayers
“speculative” at best when the government monetarily supports
religion through tax credits, the Court has narrowed Flast’s taxpayerstanding exception and significantly limited challenges to violations
of government assistance”); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 972 (2004) (“[A]ny government program can be
implemented through a direct expenditure or through the tax system.”); Erskine Bowles & Alan
Simpson, A Real Budget Deal? Yes, We Still Can, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2011, at A19 (referring
to “tax expenditures” as “the various deductions, credits and loopholes that are just spending by
another name,” in their roles as cochairmen of the National Commission of Fiscal Responsibility
and Reform).
120. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 1457.
123. See id. at 1447.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1457 (“The effect of each form of subsidy is the same, on the public fisc and
on those who contribute to it. Regardless of which mechanism the State uses, taxpayers have an
identical stake in ensuring that the State’s exercise of its taxing and spending power complies
with the Constitution.”).
126. Id. at 1462.
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of the Establishment Clause.127 However, in the words of James
Madison, government should not “force a citizen to contribute three
pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment.”128 Yes, the Court was technically correct that the
taxpayer is not directly forced to contribute his property to support
religion.129 However, what significance, if any, does the
Establishment Clause have if the government can so easily get
around this prohibition by using tax credits to support religion? With
no taxpayer standing for challenging religion-related tax credits, who
can challenge these laws as constitutional violations? In Arizona
Christian, the tax credits from the STO program amounted to
approximately $50 million per year.130 Using the majority’s logic,
there is essentially no limit on financial governmental support of
religion, as long as it is in the form of tax credits.131
The Flast opinion posed a hypothetical that questioned whether
a taxpayer would have standing to challenge government spending
for the building of a church.132 This question demonstrated the great
need for an exception to the taxpayer-standing rule for Establishment
Clause cases.133 The Court’s answer made clear that taxpayers must
be able to challenge this impermissible governmental support of
religion.134 Likewise, if the question was whether a taxpayer would
have standing to challenge a tax credit for those who give money to
build a church, the answer should still be the same—because in both
instances, the effect of the subsidy on the taxpayer is the same.135
The answer here should be clear, too—that the taxpayer must be

127. See id. at 1447.
128. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)).
129. See Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (“A dissenter whose tax dollars are ‘extracted and
spent’ knows that he has in some small measure been made to contribute to an establishment in
violation of conscience . . . . When the government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, there is
no such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” (citations omitted)).
130. Id. at 1444.
131. See id. at 1447.
132. Flast, 392 U.S. at 98 n.17.
133. See id. (noting that if taxpayers were denied standing without exception, “a taxpayer
would lack standing even if Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as
providing funds for the construction of churches for particular sects”).
134. See id.
135. Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The effect of each form of
subsidy is the same, on the public fisc and on those who contribute to it.”).
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allowed to challenge this impermissible government support of
religion.
However, it seems that the majority in Arizona Christian would
answer this question differently because of the majority’s clear
distinction between tax credits and government expenditures:
taxpayers have standing to challenge government expenditures but
do not have standing to challenge tax credits.136 Accordingly, a
taxpayer likely could not challenge a law that provides tax credits to
those who support building a church because, under Arizona
Christian, opponents of tax credits do not have standing under the
Flast exception.137 The distinction lies in how the church receives the
money, but under either situation the result is essentially the same—
the government financially supports the building of a church.138 This
hypothetical helps to show possible outcomes after the decision in
Arizona Christian and why the majority’s reasoning sets a dangerous
precedent for the future of the Establishment Clause.
With no taxpayer standing to challenge an alleged Establishment
Clause violation, such as in Arizona Christian, an alternative method
is to change the law through the political process139—which is easier
said than done.140 An informal inquiry of religion in Arizona makes
this point.141 Religion in Arizona is dominated by Christianity,

136. Id. at 1447–48 (majority opinion).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 1443 (suggesting that where no “judicial controversy” exists, the matter should
be pursued through the political process).
140. Another interesting alternative is presented by Professor Zelinsky of Harvard. See
Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?,
112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (1998). Zelinsky suggests a useful alternative to simply
distinguishing between government expenditures and tax credits in the standing context. Id. at
400. Instead of this generalized separation of the two categories, he suggests that the two often
overlap, and that “where others perceive two self-contained categories—tax benefits and direct
expenditures—[he] see[s] two overlapping bell-shaped curves.” Id. When the two overlap, he
proposes treating tax credits in a similar manner to expenditures, and he proposes treating them
differently when they do not overlap. Id. at 381–82. In distinguishing between tax credits and
direct expenditures, Zelinsky examined them in terms of their permanence, eligibility, and
quantity. Id. at 400. This method would require a case-by-case analysis to determine when a tax
credit is similar to a government expenditure. Id. at 382. In doing so, courts would examine the
nature of a tax credit compared to that of direct expenditure. Id. A case-by-case analysis may be a
less efficient method, but, as Zelinsky suggests, doing so would still be a superior alternative to
simply categorizing the two in distinct categories and never allowing standing for tax credit cases.
See id. at 400.
141. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 99
(2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
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totaling 65 percent of its population, with the next highest religious
group totaling only 22 percent of the population.142 Given these
statistics, the religious minority likely cannot win through the
political process, and the law in Arizona will not change.143 Thus,
without proper intervention by the Court, the Establishment Clause
loses significant value because the religious minority that is
negatively affected by government support of religion cannot
challenge alleged violations. The Establishment Clause was enacted
to protect the religious minority—not to protect the majority from
religion being forced on it.144 For these reasons, it is disconcerting
that the Court in Arizona Christian disregarded these principles
through its further limitation of the standing doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arizona Christian substantially altered and limited the standing
exception that the Court created in Flast. Distinguishing between
governmental expenditures and tax credits allows for governmental
support of religion by limiting the people who have standing to
challenge such forms of monetary support. With no taxpayer
standing to challenge alleged Establishment Clause violations, the
significance of the right to be free from government-established
religion is lost. This ruling significantly diminishes First Amendment
protections and is therefore a step in the wrong direction for this
country.

142. Id. These statistics are by no means a formal investigation of Arizona’s religious
population; rather they serve as a simple example to illustrate this point. See id. at 2.
143. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring
Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1591 (2005) (explaining how redistricting schemes
allow states to create districts in order to encourage representation in government by minority
groups that include racial, ethnic, economic, and religious minorities, because otherwise it would
be difficult for those minorities to enter into politics).
144. Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1551–52 (2010) (“[O]ne of the Establishment Clause’s main goals is to
protect the freedom of conscience and equality of religious outsiders.”); Steven B. Epstein,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2171 (1996)
(“The purpose of the Constitution generally, and the Establishment Clause specifically, is to
protect minorities from raw majoritarian impulses.”); see also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities . . . .”).
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